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IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
NETWORKS, SALIENCE, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN
FINANCIAL CRISES
Robert B. Ahdieh *
With the benefit of hindsight-and some aspiration to foresight-it is
useful to consider the type of regulatory regime that might best
address financial crises. What could policymakers have done to
prevent the recent crisis? And once the crisis started, what
interventions might have alleviated it? These questions have been
widely debated, with an eye to both substantive policy and the design
of effective regulatory institutions. This Article speaks to the latter
project-one of comparative institutional analysis-though with a
framework that implicates our substantive policy choices as well. It
begins with an account offinancial crises as grounded in the multiple
equilibrium character of the financial markets. Given the latter, it
suggests, questions of "salience" become central to the design of both
substantive policy and relevant institutions. To emphasize as much,
the Article considers the role of transnational regulatory networks in
preventing and responding to financial crises. Drawing on the
example of the recently re-formed Financial Stability Board, it
highlights certain inherent limits of networks, but also points to
institutional reforms that might be expected to enhance their capacity
to impact salience-and thereby play a role-in regulating financial
crises.
INTRODUCTION
We stand (hopefully) near the end of the most significant global
* Associate Dean of Faculty, Professor of Law & Director, Center on Federalism and
Intersysternic Governance, Emory University School of Law. My thanks to Barbara Black, Greg
Shaffer, conference and workshop participants at the University of British Columbia, Emory, Fordham,
George Washington, McGeorge, University of Minnesota, and Seattle University law schools, attendees
of International Law Weekend and the American Society of International Law's annual meeting, and the
editors of the University of Cincinnati Law Review, for their helpful thoughts and counsel. My title is
borrowed from Neil Komesar's well-known volume of the same name. See NEIL K. KOMESAR,
IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1997).
The ensuing analysis does not so much engage in the comparative institutional analysis that Komesar
counsels, however, as offer a framework for such comparison in the context of financial crises.
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financial crisis since the Great Depression. The full impact of that crisis,
especially over the long-term, will likely be devastating. Beyond the
immediate crisis, meanwhile, the frequency of financial crises is on the
rise.' As the last few years have made clear, however, we have a limited
sense of how to handle such crises. In the absence of financial panic, we
are unsure how to prevent it. Once it arises, we are almost as unsure
about how to alleviate it.
This uncertainty operates at two levels: first, as to matters of
substantive policy, and second, in our choice of institutional design.
This Article focuses on the latter-what regulatory structures and
institutions are likely to be most effective in preventing and alleviating
financial crises? The proposed analytical framework , however, can be
applied to substantive policy as well. 2
To get at the issue of institutional design, the Article begins with a
foundational question: What is the root cause of financial crises? There
has been a great deal of discussion regarding this question.3 For the
most part, however, it has not occurred at the level of abstraction
necessary to offer a generalized framework for the design of substantive
policy-let alone to resolve questions of institutional design. Equally
striking has been the disconnect between discussions of the causes of the
recent crisis and the analysis of potential regulatory responses. Much of
the evaluation of possible responses has proceeded unmoored from any
theory of causation-whether of the recent crisis or of financial crises
more generally.4
Against this backdrop, this Article argues that the genesis and
persistence of a financial crisis, as opposed to economic or financial
turmoil more generally, is not an issue of sub-prime mortgages, asset
securitization, inadequate risk regulation, or the failures of credit rating
1. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND CRASHES: A
HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 1 (5th ed. 2005).
2. A related article explores the implications of a "coordination" account of regulation,
including for substantive policy choices in financial crisis regulation. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The Visible
Hand: Coordination Functions ofthe Regulatory State, 95 MINN. L. REV. 578 (2010).
3. See, e.g., KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 1; Lawrence A. Cunningham & David
Zaring, The Three or Four Approaches to Financial Regulation: A Cautionary Analysis Against
Exuberance in Crisis Response, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 39, 49 n.24 (2009); RICARDO J. CABALLERO &
PABLO KURLAT, THE "SURPRISING" ORIGIN AND NATURE OF FINANCIAL CRISES (2009) (prepared for
Jackson Hole Symposium on Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policy, Aug. 20-22, 2009),
available at http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2009/papers/caballeroKurlat.08.24.09.pdf
4. At least in part, the tendency to assess solutions separate from causes of the recent crisis
might be explained by the tremendous uncertainty about the latter question, see for example, Richard
Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REv. 1151, 1198-1200
(2010), as well as some related tendency to focus on more tangible predicates, rather than more abstract,
root causes, of the financial crisis. See infra Part I.
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agencies.5  Rather, it turns on systemic patterns of risk and reward in
certain sectors of the economy, resulting interdependence in the
behavior of market participants, and the consequent tendency of relevant
markets to tip strongly (and quickly) to one equilibrium or another.
Instead of one or more of the "causes" enumerated above, it is the
presence of multiple equilibria in financial markets that was at the heart
of the recent crisis. The suggested failures of lending, asset
securitization, and risk may well be predicates to the emergence of
crisis--or at least the recent crisis. Our efforts to define an appropriate
regulatory response to financial crises are likely to go astray, however, if
we focus on these phenomena as causes.
Once we appreciate the role of multiple equilibria in the financial
markets in causing, sustaining, and alleviating financial crises, we arrive
at a distinct framework for evaluating relevant policy and institutional
design choices. A proper assessment of the comparative merits of
alternative choices depends substantially on questions of salience.
What policies or institutions can best enhance the salience of a high
rather than low-level equilibrium of lending, investment, and even
spending by market participants? Stated differently, what policies and
institutions can best coordinate expectations around a collective norm
(i.e., equilibrium) of lending, investment, and spending, as opposed to
non-lending, non-investment, and a curtailment of spending?
If these are the critical issues in preventing and alleviating financial
crises, the next question is what determines salience-a subject of
growing interest in law, economics, psychology, and neuroscience, in
recent years.8 Thus, in the particular context of financial crises, what
5. Cf Adam J. Levitin et al., Securitization: Cause or Remedy of the Financial Crisis?
(Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Bus., Econ. and Reg. Pol'y Working Paper Series, Research Paper No.
1462895, 2009; Inst. for Law & Econ., Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., Research Paper No. 09-31, 2009),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1462895; William Poole, Causes And Consequences Of The
Financial Crisis Of 2007-2009, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 421, 424-26 (2010); Hal S. Scott, The
Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 671
(2010); Jim Puzzanghera, Financial Overhaul on Deck, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 2010, at 4.
6. See infra Part I. Multiple equilibria exist where we find more than one paired set of
strategies from which no relevant participant can gain through unilateral action. See Clayton P. Gillette,
Cooperation and Convention in Contractual Defaults, 3 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 167, 174 (1993).
7. See ROBERT SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OF RIGHTS, CO-OPERATION AND WELFARE 89-90
(1986); see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57-58 (1960).
8. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66
(2000); Judith Mehta, Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, The Nature of Salience: An Experimental
Investigation ofPure Coordination Games, 84 AM. ECON. REVIEw 658 (1994); Christopher L. Peterson,
Usury Law, Payday Loans, and Statutory Slight of Hand: Salience Distortion in American Credit
Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REv. 1110, 1137-38 (2008); Jennifer J. Ratcliff et al., The Hidden
Consequences Of Racial Salience In Videotaped Interrogations And Confessions, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 200 (2010); Sarah Rosenfeld et al., The Self and Mental Health: Self-Salience and the
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policies are likely to increase the salience of active lending by banks and
renewed investment by hedge funds and private equity firms (on which
banks depend for their ability to lend)?9 More precisely, how might we
enhance the expectations of any given bank, hedge fund, or private
equity firm that other banks, hedge funds, and private equity firms stand
ready to lend and invest? And, as to the institutional design question
emphasized herein, what factors will render relevant policymaking
structures more salient-and hence consequential-in shaping such
expectations?
To evaluate as much, this Article suggests four critical determinants
of salience in the analysis of institutional design choices.' 0 Echoing
Thomas Schelling's analysis of "focal points," to begin, salience is
likely to be determined by both the familiarity and the visibility of a
given institution." Likewise, the relative singularity or uniqueness of
an institution can be expected to play a role in determining its salience to
market participants. Finally, the Article identifies authority, including
dimensions of both expertise and legitimacy, as a fourth important
determinant of salience.
Given the particular "cause" of financial crises offered herein, and the
resulting orientation to salience in analyzing regulatory interventions
directed to such crises-the emphases of Parts I and II respectively-
what conclusions follow for relevant institutional design choices in
addressing financial crises? Consider a few such choices: Should we
rely primarily on international or national institutions in responding to
financial crises? Among other contexts, this has been an important
question in Europe' 2 and in the decision to re-empower the International
Monetary Fund after years of growing desuetude. 13  A second
institutional design choice has been whether to settle for imperfect but
extant institutions or to establish new ones, in responding to crises.14
Emergence ofInternalizing and Externalizing Problems, 46 J. HEALTH & Soc. BEHAV. 323 (2005).
9. See Ahdieh, supra note 2.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See SCHELLING, supra note 7, at 57-58.
12. Much debate has centered on the respective roles of the European Commission versus
individual members states in addressing the financial crisis. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Dam, The Subprime
Crisis And Financial Regulation: International And Comparative Perspectives, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 581,
603-04 (2010); Steven Erlanger, Economic Crisis Pits the European Union Against Its Members, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2009, at Al; Press Release, European Comm'n, EU Cohesion Policy Crucial to Help
Regions Overcome Crisis (June 3, 2010), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/
infopress/2010053 11PR75308/2010053 IPR75308 en.pdf.
13. See Henry Chu et al., Rx for World Economy: Leaders Pledge $1.1 Trillion to Help Poor,
Pushfor Regulations, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 3, 2009, at 12.
14. Contrasting U.S. and German approaches are suggestive here, see Thomas Mahlich et al.,
Germany Adopts Its Own Rescue Package for Financial Institutions, MONDAQ, Nov. 13, 2008,
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Finally, there is the increasingly prominent question of the role of
transnational regulatory networks in addressing financial crises-from
the International Organization of Securities Commissions and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, to the International Association of
Insurance Supervisors and the Financial Stability Board.'s
With regard to each of these challenges of comparative institutional
design, an analysis of salience offers insight into potential strengths and
weaknesses. No alternative is likely to prove perfect. At least in
particular contexts, however, more or less effective options can be
identified. To suggest as much, Part III explores the last of the
aforementioned choices: the reliance on transnational networks versus
more structured institutions, in preventing and responding to global
financial crises. In particular, it highlights the case of the Financial
Stability Forum-and its mid-crisis "re-establishment" as the Financial
Stability Board-as a helpful window into the framework of salience
suggested.16
Before continuing, a word of caution is in order: The framework
offered herein does not purport to be a solution to financial crises, let
alone a "magic bullet" to prevent future crises. An emphasis on the
multiple equilibrium character of the financial markets is simply a first
step in the effort to understand the nature of such crises. The proposed
framework for the analysis of salience is likewise intended as
suggestive. The goal of this Article is not to explain or solve financial
crises, thus, but to offer a framework for their analysis and to suggest a
distinct account of the potential role that regulatory institutions may play
in facilitating their avoidance and alleviation.
I. THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
In identifying the root cause of financial crises, the first task is to
define what we mean by "crisis."' 7 A crisis, properly conceived, should
be understood as something more than simply economic difficulty, even
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=69730, as is the G-20's decision to rely on the IMF-for
both the distribution of financial assistance and a range of new initiatives-rather than establishing some
distinct international lender of last resort or global financial regulator, see Chu et al., supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., David Zaring, Three Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT'L LAW. 211, 216
(2009).
16. See Bretton Woods Revisited, GLOBE & MAIL, Apr. 3, 2009, at A12 (noting transition to the
Financial Stability Board).
17. Cf CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
CRISES 3-4 (4th ed. 2000) ("The first edition of this book failed to include a definition of financial
crisis, though it may be that [they are] hard to define but recognizable when encountered."); Frank
Partnoy, Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REv. 741 (2000).
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when such difficulty is of substantial depth or breadth. As to the former,
no matter how significant the impact of General Motors' bankruptcy, it
does not constitute a crisis in isolation.'8  The same might even be said
of the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy, had it been possible to effectively
contain its effects.' 9
Even widespread economic difficulty may not constitute a crisis.
Entire industries-be it the auto industry or the airlines-may be
struggling. Entire sectors of an economy may be in decline, as has been
true of U.S. manufacturing for the last forty years.20 Yet we still may
not face a crisis, if the weakness in said industry or sector does not
exhibit some systemic quality-a certain species of interdependence-
whether within the relevant industry or sector, or beyond it. Unless the
losses of one are prone to generate losses for others, talk of a crisis is
misplaced. 2 1 Financial or economic crises can thus be understood to
possess a certain dynamic quality. They are characterized by the
spread-the metastasization-of otherwise individuated economic
difficulties and challenges.
In the international financial markets, this critical characteristic of
crisis is captured in talk of "contagion," where currency crises or other
financial shocks in one locale trigger crises in other nations, whether
near, as in the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis, or far, as in the extended
reach of the 1998 Russian debt default.22 Such interdependence can
likewise be seen in the rhetoric of "containment." 23 Anna Gelpern has
thus emphasized distinct tasks of crisis containment, financial
regulation, crisis prevention, and crisis resolution.24 It is the particular
18. See Ken Bensinger & Martin Zimmerman, GM in Chapter 11, L.A. TIMES, June 2, 2009, at
1.
19. See Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 183, 197-200 (2009).
20. See Jeffrey D. Sachs et al., Trade and Jobs in US. Manufacturing, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMic ACTIVITY 1 (1994).
21. It was for precisely this reason that suggestions of potential taxpayer assistance to British
Petroleum (BP), in dealing with the costs of the April 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, were quickly
retracted. There would be no crisis, even were BP to collapse.
22. See NOURIEL ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, BAILOUTS OR BAIL-INS? - RESPONDING TO
FINANCIAL CRISES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 43-44 (2004). Behind this pattern, one might see a
network externality of sorts, in which the returns to lending and investment-and hence the benefits of
continued market engagement-are keyed to the participation of others. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Making
Markets: Network Effects And The Role Of Law In The Creation Of Strong Securities Markets, 76 S.
CAL. L. REv. 277, 288 (2003) ("Network effects are positive consumption externalities; they arise where
the utility of a good to one user increases as other users acquire or utilize it."); Mark A. Lemley & David
McGowan, Legal Implications ofNetwork Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 481 (1998).
23. See Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1051 (2009).
24. See id. Beyond the rhetoric of contagion and containment, talk of "confidence in the
markets" and "crises of confidence" can likewise be understood to echo the framework this Article
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task of containment, however, that speaks to the essence of financial
crisis.
If the characteristic feature of financial crises is not economic
decline-however deep or broad it might be-but interdependence and
the resulting potential for the diffusion of such decline, much of the
discussion regarding the causes of the recent financial crisis proves to be
off-base. Many among those asserted causes, of course, revolve around
the bubble in U.S. housing prices, and its eventual burst. Observers
have thus critiqued: (1) the Community Reinvestment Act's requirement
of greater mortgage lending to sub-prime borrowers; (2) the Federal
Reserve's abandonment of the Taylor Rule and failures to deflate the
housing bubble; (3) the securitization of sub-prime mortgages; and (4)
credit rating agencies' offering of investment-grade ratings to the
resulting securities. 25 Others have blamed securitization generally, risk-
taking by the American Insurance Group's Financial Products division,
and the limited or fragmented regulation of derivatives and hedge
funds.26 Many, if not all, of these contributed to the financial difficulties
that emerged amidst the recent crisis. In a sense, they might even be
seen as predicates of the crisis. To describe them as causes of the crisis,
however, overlooks at least as much as it captures. Of particular
importance for present purposes, it distorts the analysis of how to
appropriately respond to such crises, both ex ante and ex post.
If we are concerned with what causes financial difficulties in one
firm, sector, or industry to metastasize into a crisis, it is necessary to
focus on the multiple equilibrium dynamic at work in the financial
markets.2 7 The legal literature, notwithstanding important contributions
to the study of financial markets,28 has not attended adequately to this
multiple equilibrium dynamic. This has been so, notwithstanding its
close relationship to subjects that have received substantial attention-
including network externalities and social norms.29
advances.
25. See, e.g., Marcy Gordon, Street of Schemes, NEWSDAY, Apr. 17, 2010, at A03; Paul
Krugman, Berating the Raters, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A23; Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market
Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113, 118 (2009) (critiquing Federal Reserve Bank's abandonment of
Taylor Rule); see also supra note 5.
26. See, e.g., Barbara C. George et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry:
Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 359 (2009); William K.
Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 943 (2009).
27. See supra note 6.
28. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984).
29. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Ahdieh, supra note 22. To be
sure, other multiple equilibrium-related issues-including questions of standard-setting and the analysis
of coordination games-have received far less attention among legal scholars. See Richard H.
2010] 533
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At least in part, this inattention can be explained by legal scholars'
disproportionate emphasis on what might be seen as the opposite of a
multiple equilibrium dynamic: the dominant strategy dynamic at work in
a single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma, where players are incentivized to
(inefficiently) confess, regardless of the behavior of their counterparts. 30
Multiple equilibrium settings including the financial markets, the
internet, standard-setting processes, and technological innovation, by
contrast, are characterized by the availability of more than one stable set
of strategies, from which players have no incentive to defect, absent a
change in strategy by their counterparts.
Thus, in the classic metaphor of coordination among multiple
equilibria, two or more drivers can choose to drive either on the right or
on the left, and lack any incentive to change sides unless they expect the
other driver will do so as well. This is likewise the dynamic at work
among market participants in standard-setting and network settings,
including in the choice between VHS and Betamax video recorders, Blu-
ray or HD DVD players, and various alternative protocols for internet
file transfers. 32 Once a given standard has emerged, we are incentivized
to embrace and maintain it.
In the financial markets, something similar can be observed.
Consider the classic bank ran-the most conventional manifestation of a
financial crisis, and the case study for early models of multiple equilibria
in financial markets.33 In a bank run, crisis is triggered by the abrupt
demand for withdrawals by the mass of depositors. Given the fractional
reserve banking structure of modern banks, in which reserves represent
only a small proportion of a bank's outstanding liabilities, 34 this demand
cannot possibly be met, driving even the most well-capitalized, healthy
banks into bankruptcy.
Attempting to formally model this pattern, economists Douglas
Diamond and Philip Dybvig identified the critical characteristic of
McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners'Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV.
209 (2009).
30. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Law's Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law in Market Transition, 77 S.
CAL. L. REv. 215, 229-30 (2004); McAdams, supra note 29, at 224 n.54.
31. See McAdams, supra note 29, at 212.
32. See Ahdieh, supra note 2.
33. See Douglas W. Diamond & Phillip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. EcON. 401 (1983).
34. In a fractional reserve system, a bank's reserves cover only a small portion of its obligations.
The system depends, as such, on staggered and limited withdrawals by depositors or noteholders. See
LLOYD B. THOMAS, MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 283, 665 (1997); Lewis D. Solomon,
Local Currency: A Legal and Policy Analysis, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59, 61 (1996); see also Henry
N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L.
REV. 677, 718 (1988).
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modem banking and of bank runs as the presence of multiple
equilibria.35  In the preferred equilibrium, depositors place their funds
with the bank, confident in their ability to withdraw on whatever future
date they can make optimal use of their funds. This allows others to
withdraw on earlier optimal dates, thereby generating an efficient
distribution of risk. In the inferior equilibrium, by contrast, confidence
in the behavior of other depositors is undermined, causing all depositors
to seek immediate, sub-optimal withdrawal of their assets and thereby
breaking the bank. The essential dynamic of modem banking,
consequently, is one in which coordination of depositors around the
equilibrium of "maintain deposits" generates optimal returns. In
contrast, coordination around the equilibrium of "withdraw deposits"
breaks the bank.
This multiple equilibrium dynamic is not unique, however, to banks
or bank runs. Rather, it is characteristic of the financial markets more
generally-if not inherently, at least in their modem forms. The
operation of financial markets today thus involves a significant degree of
interconnection and coordination. The returns on an investment to any
given individual, meanwhile, are often keyed to its attraction to others.36
The result, once again, is a multiple equilibrium dynamic.
A growing body of work on the financial markets, including among
legal scholars, echoes this conclusion.37 A few examples are suggestive:
Financial markets have been characterized to exhibit "strategic
complementarities"-a positive feedback dynamic along just the lines
described supra, whereby increases in production by one firm increase
the marginal revenues of other firms, incentivizing them to increase
production as well. 38 Accounts of "herd behavior" in the financial
35. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 33, at 402 ("This vulnerability occurs because there are
multiple equilibria with differing levels of confidence."); see also id. at 404 (describing "full-
information optimal risk-sharing" equilibrium and bank run equilibrium, in which "all agents [are]
panicking and trying to withdraw their deposits at T= 1").
36. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 156 (1936) (arguing that the stock market works like a newspaper beauty contest, in which
share prices change based on buyers' predictions of how others will value shares, rather than their
fundamental value); see also Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Security Regulation:
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 866 (1992).
37. In earlier work, I have described the presence of network externalities in the microstructure
of secondary securities markets-an analysis that might likewise be counted among the approaches
described above. See Ahdieh, supra note 30, at 223-25; Ahdieh, supra note 22.
38. See Russell Cooper & Andrew John, Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian
Models, 103 Q. J. ECON. 441, 447 (1988); see also Jeremy Bulow et al., Multimarket Oligopoly:
Strategic Substitutes and Strategic Complements, 93 J. POL. ECON. 488 (1985). This is precisely the
domain, of course, of network externalities. See supra note 37; see also Michael L. Katz & Carl
Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 424 (1985).
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markets are similar. 39  In this account, by contrast with that of strategic
complementarities, the relevant behavior of market participants is
irrational. 40  However, the end result is the same: investment choices
move in tandem, with decisions by one or more market participants
mimicked by others, such that behavior is effectively coordinated.4 1
Among others, each of these accounts 42  bespeaks a multiple
equilibrium conception of the financial markets. Thus, where strategic
complementarities are present, financial markets can be expected to
operate like the banking system, in which depositors collectively settle
on either an equilibrium of maintaining deposits or withdrawing them,
based on their expectations of one another. In the presence of strategic
complementarities, one can expect relatively consistent patterns in the
lending, investment, and perhaps even spending behavior of market
participants.43 Banks will either lend or refuse to lend largely in tandem
with one another; hedge funds and private equity firms will hold back or
aggressively compete for investment opportunities as a group. Herd
behavior is to similar effect, with the pack moving to either the high-
level or low-level equilibrium, depending on relevant expectations and
the resulting behavior of early movers."
This brings us back to the nature of financial crises as characterized
not by economic distress per se, but by the spread and dissemination of
such distress. In a multiple equilibrium conception of the financial
markets, such contagion can be understood to occur when the market
moves-necessarily abruptly-from a high-level to a low-level
equilibrium of lending, investment, and spending. Banks refuse to lend.
The market for credit default swaps disappears. Private equity
39. See Christopher Avery & Peter Zemsky, Multidimensional Uncertainty and Herd Behavior in
Financial Markets, 88 AM. ECON. REv. 724 (1998); Varadarajan V. Chari & Patrick J. Kehoe, Financial
Crises as Herds: Overturning the Critiques, 119 J. ECON. THEORY 128 (2004); see also Abhijit V.
Baneijee, A Simple Model ofHerd Behavior, 107 Q. J. ECON. 797 (1992); cf Paul Krugman, A Model of
Balance-of-Payment Crises, 11 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 311 (1979).
40. The emphasis on herd behavior in the financial markets can also be seen to echo "greater
fool" theories of those markets. Cf James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Research Analyst
Conflicts ofInterest and the Market for Underwriting Business, 35 J. LEGAL STuD. 303, 308 (2006).
41. Again, one might recall Keynes' vivid portrayal of financial markets as a beauty contest, in
which each observer's assessment is defined by the expected assessment of others. See supra note 36.
Besides analyses of strategic complementarities and herd behavior, as noted in the text, the distinct study
of systemic risk, including by Steven Schwarcz, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193 (2008), might also be seen to turn on the dynamic suggested.
42. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
43. Spending will often lack the systemic quality prevalent in lending and investment. The
confidence that stands behind at least some spending (e.g., in continued economic activity and growth),
however, may cause it to likewise be dependent on expected spending by others.
44. With the dynamic of systemic risk, see supra note 41, the presence of multiple equilibria
turns on the relevant risk trigger having been set off, or not, at any given point in time.
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investment dries up. And we find ourselves precisely where we were
just a few short months ago.
Why do banks, traders, private equity firms, and others cut back their
lending, investing, and spending? Because each individual or institution
determines that they expect other banks, traders, and private equity firms
to do so. Based on the multiple equilibrium structure of their returns,
this expectation advises them to do so as well. 4 5 The critical cause of
the recent financial crisis, then, was not sub-prime lending, excessive
risk-taking, or the housing bubble. Rather, it was a shift in expectations
from a high-level to a low-level equilibrium of lending, investment, and
spending.46
II. THE SALIENCE OF LENDING AND INVESTMENT
ON THE FINANCIAL MARKETS
If financial crises arise from the multiple equilibrium character of
financial markets, it is necessary to address the latter in designing a
regulatory approach to preventing and alleviating such crises.
Regulating sub-prime lending, creating a prudential risk regulator,
placing greater restraints on credit rating agencies, and increasing the
regulation of hedge funds-among other policy proposals that have been
tabled-are all important initiatives. They may even help avoid the next
financial crisis, by eliminating critical predicates to it. However, they do
not address the systemic dynamic that is the essential source of a
financial crisis. Given as much, they are unlikely to suffice in avoiding
such crises.
Rather, the critical task for regulation in the face of potential crisis
must be to coordinate market participants around relevant high-level
equilibria-whether of lending, investment, or spending. Our choice of
substantive rules, as well as operative institutional structures, must serve
to sustain high-level equilibria in each category. Once a crisis begins, in
turn, relevant law and regulation must encourage a return to those
equilibria (i.e., must displace the low-level equilibria that characterize
the relevant crisis).
How can regulatory regimes do so? In significant part, by attending
to the relatively unfamiliar-yet intuitive-role of "salience" in multiple
45. The argument herein is not that all financial market returns are characterized by such a
multiple equilibrium dynamic. But many important strands are.
46. Of course, one might pinpoint the cause of financial crises as whatever it is that leads market
participants to conclude that the low-level equilibrium is emerging. From my perspective, the
distinction between the latter and my account of cause is primarily semantic. The critical point is that
general policies or practices of sub-prime lending and excess risk-taking should not be understood as the
cause of financial crises.
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equilibria settings. In the strategic choice among multiple equilibria,
relatively more salient (or prominent) equilibria are most likely to
emerge.47 Why? Because such equilibria can be expected to be salient
to others as well.
Emphasizing the importance of salience, Thomas Schelling famously
suggested a role for "focal points" in the solution to coordination
games.48 A given location, outcome, or other equilibrium may thus
serve as a "focal point for each person's expectation of what the other
expects him to expect to be expected to do."49 The precise source of this
focal quality, however, remains unclear. Minimally, the identification of
focal points is not solely a matter of reason. As Schelling emphasized,
the task of coordination is more in the nature of art than science.50 The
challenge of coordination lies precisely in the fact that no solution can
be mathematically derived from relevant incentives. Rather, it turns on
the complex psychological, sociological, contextual, and historical
dynamics of salience.
In the context of financial crises, an emphasis on salience favors
substantive policies that increase the focal quality of the high-level
equilibrium of lending, investment, and spending described supra.
Federal deposit insurance, for example, was a classic policy initiative
directed to this end, following the bank runs that characterized the Great
Depression.5  By insuring against depositor losses, the government
increased the salience of a "maintain deposits" equilibrium--even for
those not fully protected.52 Recent policy decisions might also be
evaluated along these lines, including public investment in banking
institutions, the taking of warrants in those firms, and the Federal
Reserve Bank's stress tests of major U.S. banks.53 In various ways,
each of these policies helped to increase the salience of a high-level
equilibrium of lending and investment.
47. See Robert Sugden, A Theory ofFocal Points, 105 EcON. J. 533 (1995).
48. See SCHELLING, supra note 7, at 57.
49. Id.
50. See id at 7.
51. Created in 1933 by the Glass-Steagall Act, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) is an independent agency of the federal government, which guarantees deposits at specific
insured banks or thrift institutions. Additionally, the FDIC exercises considerable supervisory and
resolution authority over insured institutions experiencing financial difficulty. See Onnig H.
Dombalagian, Requiem For The Bulge Bracket?: Revisiting Investment Bank Regulation, 85 IND. L.J.
777, 782 n.19, 784, 809 n.163 (2010); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., http://www.fdic.gov (last visited June 12,
2010).
52. This is the critical point. Even if my deposits are largely unprotected (i.e., if they are well
above the statutory cap), my expectations of a bank run are low-given the FDIC's effective protection
of the vast majority of those who might otherwise make a run on the bank.
53. See Ahdieh, supra note 2.
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This Article focuses not on substantive policy choices, however, but
on the distinct question of institutional design. What institutional
characteristics of relevant regulatory institutions will maximize their
capacity to impact the salience of alternative lending and investing
equilibria? Are national or international institutions more likely to
render the efficient equilibrium focal? Is establishing new institutions
preferable or are existing institutions more likely to impact the salience
of a preferred coordination point? And finally, as explored in Part III,
how capable are regulatory networks of shaping salience, as compared
to more structured and formalized institutions?
To assess these questions, the first step is to define the relevant
determinants of salience. With regard to the shaping of salience in other
respects-including perhaps in the design of substantive policy-any
number of potential factors might be identified. As to questions of
institutional design, however, four factors might be emphasized: (1)
familiarity, (2) visibility, (3) singularity/uniqueness, and (4) authority.
Although not previously drawn out in this fashion-or explored with
particular emphasis on institutional design-the first three can be
derived from Schelling's analysis of focal points and subsequent
scholarly work.54  The suggested role of authority, meanwhile, steps
beyond that analysis."
The relative familiarity of an institution, to begin, is likely to impact
its salience in shaping the expectations of market participants. Any
given market actor might thus expect an institution familiar to her to
likewise be familiar to others and, given the latter's similar orientation to
the expectations of others, to therefore be more likely to shape market
behavior generally. An institution such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), for example, might have a greater impact on expectations
due to its relative familiarity, as compared to a newly established
entity. 56 The degree of media attention to a given institution might also
54. See SCHELLING, supra note 7, at 57; Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in
Anarchy: An Expressive Theory of International Dispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1229,
1268 (2004); David S. Law, A Theory ofJudicial Power and Judicial Review, 97 GEO. L.J. 723, 771-77
(2009) (discussing focal points in relation to judicial power).
55. To be sure, there is significant overlap among the distinct determinants of salience this
Article suggests. However, it remains useful to separate them in seeking to analyze alternative
institutional choices.
56. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established in 1945, as part of the Bretton
Woods system, to oversee the international monetary system. During the Great Depression, countries
attempted to stabilize their economies by increasing barriers to trade and devaluing their national
currencies, with disastrous results for world trade, employment, and living standards. In response to
these challenges, the IMF sought to "ensure exchange rate stability and encourage its member countries
to eliminate exchange restrictions that hindered trade." See Int'l Monetary Fund, History: Cooperation
and Reconstruction (1944-71), http://www.imf.org/external/aboutihistcoop.htm (last visited June 12,
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be important in evaluating its capacity to avoid and alleviate financial
crises.
Questions of visibility follow naturally from the latter, though they
are distinct. Consider, for example, the infamous Trilateral
Commission-widely fingered by Vietnam War-era conspiracy theorists
to be the operational heart of the military-industrial complex driving
U.S. government policy.57  Though absurdly familiar, the Trilateral
Commission was not in the least bit visible. This lack of visibility, in
fact, was what made it such an attractive candidate for wild-eyed
conspiracy theorists. Beyond familiarity, then, it may be important that
relevant market participants see a given institution as enjoying a certain
visibility-a certain prominence-among their fellow market
participants. If I am to conclude that a given institution will
meaningfully shape expectations-and thereby sustain (or displace) an
extant equilibrium-I might expect it to have the visibility necessary to
do so. The visibility of an institution may thus impact its salience,
separate and apart from its familiarity.
Determinants of visibility might include geography and participation,
among other factors. As to geography, one might expect institutions
based in Geneva or Washington to be more visible than those
headquartered in Basel or Copenhagen. An institution with no fixed
headquarters would presumably be even less visible. For similar
reasons, the siting of a summit meeting in Pittsburgh-as with the
September 2009 G-20 summit-versus London or Washington, might
also affect salience.59 As to participation, meanwhile, one might expect
2010); Jeanne Asherman, The International Monetary Fund: A History of Compromise, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 235 (1984). It now has 186 members and plays "a leading role [in addressing]
economic, macro-financial and sovereign risk concerns," by way of its "regular surveillance and crisis
work, as well as consultations with market participants, academics, and country authorities." See Int'l
Monetary Fund, Factsheet: IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercises, https://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/
facts/pdf/ewe.pdf (last visited June 10, 2010); see also Lex Rieffel, Keep the IMF at the Center, in THE
G-20 FINANCIAL SUMMIT: SEVEN ISSUES AT STAKE 20-21 (2008).
57. See Wilson Huhn, Political Alienation In America and the Legal Premises of the Patriot
Movement, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 422 (1998) ("Members of the [Patriot] Movement believe that a
cartel of international bankers, the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, or the
United Nations is attempting to create a world government called the New World Order."); Nicholas D.
Kristof, Learning How to Run: A West Texas Stumble, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2000, at Al (noting that
George W. Bush's campaign for Congress in 1978 was negatively impacted by his father's membership
in the Trilateral Commission, which many people believed was seeking to create a world government);
see also STEPHEN GILL, AMERICAN HEGEMONY AND THE TRILATERAL COMMISSION (1991); Jeremiah
Project, http://www.jeremiahproject.com/newworldorder/nworder07.html (last visited June 12, 2010).
58. Compare the World Health Organization, World Trade Organization, International Monetary
Fund, World Bank, and the secretariat of the North American Free Trade Agreement, with the Bank for
International Settlements, see http://www.bis.org (last visited June 12, 2010), and the International
Council for Exploration of the Sea, see http://www.ices.dk/indexfla.asp (last visited June 12, 2010).
59. See Group of Twenty, http://www.g20.org/index.aspx (last visited June 12, 2010).
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organizations populated by heads of state or even finance ministers to
enjoy relatively greater visibility. More absurd, recalling the first year
of the Obama presidency, one might imagine that those organizations
whose summits are attended by Michelle Obama would enjoy greater
visibility as well. 60 Those that are regularly protested might also have
greater visibility. 6 1  Even "participation" broadly defined, the latter
examples suggest, may impact visibility and hence salience.
Singularity (or uniqueness) may also be important. 62  An institution
may be more salient to market participants if it is distinct or unique. The
pronouncements of Alan Greenspan or Ben Bernanke may have
influence as much because of the distinct position they hold, as because
of any sense of their expertise or authority over relevant policy.63
Likewise, even on matters beyond his authority, policy assertions of the
U.S. president may enjoy a salience not possessed by members of
Congress, given the more singular nature of his constitutional position.
As to financial crises, one might consider the relative singularity of
international versus national (and hence multiple) institutions. In
selecting among alternative international institutions, meanwhile, one
might imagine that the ability of the various "Group" organizations,
including the G-7, G-8, G-20, and G-77, to shape salience would be
limited by their multiplicity.
A final potential determinant of institutional salience might be a given
institution's authority-though not necessarily the formal authority to
dictate policy in the particular setting of interest. While surely
important, the authority to dictate policy speaks to a distinct dynamic
than the one of coordination that stands at the heart of financial crises.
As to the latter, the operative question is not coercive authority of the
formal sort but the perceived authority of a given institution, and its
resulting capacity to coordinate expectations." In the present setting,
60. See Alistair Macdonald, First Lady and the Queen Make a Big Impression, WALL ST. J., Apr.
3, 2009, at A8 (reporting on Michelle Obama's embrace of the Queen of England, at the G-20 summit in
London); cf George Vecsey, Brazil's Olympic Bid Gets Presidential Push, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2009,
at B14 (reporting on the role of Michelle Obama at Copenhagen meeting of International Olympic
Committee).
61. See I.M.F. Shortens Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2001, at A8 (describing the decision of
the IMF and the World Bank to cut annual meetings short, in anticipation of protests by thousands of
anti-globalization activists).
62. See Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 54, at 1265.
63. See Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
2008, at Al (noting that Alan Greenspan was "a revered figure affectionately nicknamed the Oracle");
cf Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the
Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 1613, 1676 (2009).
64. See Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Transformations: Change,
Resistance and Recursivity 41 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[Tihe power of
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authority is not an end unto itself, but the means to desired ends.
One dimension of such authority is relevant expertise. In assessing
the comparative efficacy of distinct institutions in shaping the salience
of alternative equilibria, perceived knowledge and expertise are likely to
play an important role. A familiar, visible, and unique institution with
little claim of expertise as to the question presented might not be
expected to enjoy significant focal point power. Take, for example,
Alan Greenspan's position on the choice between Blu-ray and HD DVD
standards. Even before his fall from grace, his views on the latter seem
unlikely to exhibit meaningful salience, regardless of how visible or
unique he was. Few choosing between the competing standards would
expect his inexpert views to impact others' choice of standard. By
contrast, his assessment of the likely inflationary or stimulus effects of
the Bush Administration's proposed tax cuts would be widely expected
to impact others' choices.
To be sure, expertise need not always be present. As Schelling
famously described, a bystander with no formal authority might assume
significant power to direct traffic in a gridlocked intersection, if the
traffic lights should fail and no other, more official means of
coordination presents itself.65 The relevant pedestrian may not have any
particular expertise in civil engineering or traffic management.
Nonetheless, the unique nature of her signals-and perhaps their
visibility-might suffice to render them salient. This suggests the
potential for some hydraulic dimension in the determination of
salience. 66 Even in the absence of other indicators, a significant degree
of singularity may suffice; conversely, distinct expertise and resulting
authority may enable observers to effectively distinguish among non-
unique institutions or actors.
The impact of authority on salience may also depend on questions of
legitimacy. Institutions with greater legitimacy may be more capable of
shaping the expectations of market participants as between competing
coordination points. Such legitimacy begins with political legitimacy of
the familiar sort. Here, the question is whether certain substantive or
transnational law's perceived legitimacy, as opposed to simple coercion, has the greatest influence in
affecting domestic legal change.").
65. See SCHELLING, supra note 7, at 63.
66. Cf Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics ofParty Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131
(2005) (arguing that campaign finance donors will respond to regulatory changes in a "hydraulic"
fashion, finding alternative means to provide financial support).
67. See RODNEY BARKER, POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND THE STATE 11 (1990) ("[L]egitimacy is
precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those
commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense
to have moral authority, because subjects believe that they ought to obey."), quoted in Edward Rubin,
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procedural characteristics legitimatize an institution's pronouncements
on a particular question of coordination. More broadly, one might think
of legitimacy in multiple equilibrium settings as incorporating
dimensions of longevity, an established record of engagement or
efficacy as to a given issue, and a capacity for prompt intervention. 68
Yet the limits of legitimacy as a determinant of salience should be
recognized. Again, Schelling's example of the pedestrian in the
intersection is instructive. The pedestrian's directives are quite salient to
the trapped drivers, notwithstanding her clear lack of legitimacy.69
Stating the point more broadly, legitimacy is not essential to determining
the focal power of regulatory institutions, by contrast with other, more
conventional expressions of regulatory power.70  Thus, the regulatory
dynamic at work in multiple equilibrium settings-the nature of any
intervention designed to facilitate efficient coordination, whether in
addressing financial crises, facilitating standard-setting, or encouraging
innovation71-is not defined primarily by legitimacy or authority.
While legitimacy may impact salience, a lack of legitimacy is not
determinative of it. Even a purely private actor-like the pedestrian in
the jammed intersection-may have significant focal power.72
Finally, it bears noting that relevant authority for the purpose of
shaping the salience of alternative institutions might well arise outside
the policy arena of interest. An entity with broad authority over policy
in financial market regulation, for example, might be able to leverage
that authority in facilitating coordination in anti-corruption efforts or in
the curtailment of terrorism financing. Here, any claim of expertise or
legitimacy is weak, but the relevant institution's authority may
nonetheless generate meaningful salience.
III. SALIENCE, COORDINATION, AND THE ROLE OF NETWORKS IN
FINANCIAL CRISES
This Article has argued that an effective regulatory approach to
preventing and alleviating financial crises-as distinct from economic
It's Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 95, n.277
(2003).
68. Expertise might likewise be expected to impact perceived legitimacy.
69. One might go further: even if the relevant volunteer was not a pedestrian, but a passenger in
one of the cars stuck in the intersection-and hence quite self-interested in her directives-she might
play no less a coordinative role.
70. See Ahdieh, supra note 2 (suggesting potential for private actors to serve regulatory
coordination functions).
71. See id
72. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
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difficulties and challenges more generally-must recognize the multiple
equilibrium dynamic at the heart of the financial markets. The central
goal of regulatory interventions directed to financial crises must be to
increase or maintain the salience of a high-level equilibrium of lending,
investment, and spending, and thereby to coordinate expectations around
it. The ability of particular regulatory institutions to do so depends on
four characteristics: their familiarity, their visibility, their singularity,
and their authority (including as manifest in their expertise and
legitimacy).
What implications might be derived from this framework, as to the
regulatory architecture directed to financial crises? As suggested supra,
a number of critical institutional design questions have arisen over the
last few years, including the choice between international and national
institutions, the use of existing institutions versus the establishment of
new ones, and the role of regulatory networks versus more formal
institutions in responding to financial crises.
Focusing on the role of networks in financial crises, this Part explores
the implications of a salience analysis for the overall choice of
institutional form and for particular facets of institutional design. After
highlighting the great expectations of regulatory networks among
scholars and policymakers in recent years and their disappointingly
limited role in the recent financial crisis, thus, it draws on the
determinants of salience outlined supra to analyze the recently "re-
established" Financial Stability Board.
A. Expectation and Reality in the Role ofRegulatory Networks
In recent years, transnational regulatory networks have been the
subject of growing interest among legal scholars. Inspired by the
seminal work of Anne-Marie Slaughter,n Janet Levit, Kal Raustiala,
Charles Whitehead, David Zaring, and others have explored the
development, nature, and role of such networks, including the Financial
Action Task Force, the International Competition Network, the
International Organization of Securities Commissions, and the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and
Enforcement.74 Financial regulatory networks have figured prominently
in the literature, meanwhile, including the Basel Committee on Banking
73. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004).
74. See, e.g., Hari M. Osofsky & Janet K. Levit, The Scale ofNetworks?, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 409
(2008); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture ofInternational Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and
the Future ofInternational Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002); Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?:
International Norms, Signals, and Compliance, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695 (2006).
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Supervision and the Financial Stability Forum.
In much of the literature, transnational regulatory networks have been
cast as arising from the increasingly disaggregated character of the
modem nation-state.76 In the face of forces pushing authority both
downward, to sub-national entities, and upward, to transnational
entities-as well as increasing pressures toward specialization-
networks emerge as something of a middle ground, preserving national-
level authority, but in a distinct form.
That form revolves particularly around the expert status of relevant
participants. Drawing on the study of so-called "epistemic
communities," the transnational network literature sees regulatory
networks as comprised of expert, agency-level representatives from
participating states. Such officials ultimately emerge as a kind of
community, however, rather than as mere representatives.
Commitments come to run to the network itself, given participants'
recurrent engagement with one another over issues of shared expertise.7 8
That being said, networks remain consultative in nature, developing
standards, norms, and guidelines to be carried back to participating state
authorities for approval or rejection. The network itself lacks authority
to bind.79
Beyond these dimensions of their positive character, the normative
enthusiasm surrounding transnational regulatory networks also deserves
mention. Networks have been the subject of exceedingly great
expectations. Perhaps most prominently, Anne-Marie Slaughter has cast
them as a solution to the perennial dilemma of how to reconcile the need
for transnational solutions to a growing array of social and economic
challenges, and the countervailing tug of sovereignty and attendant
80
concerns of legitimacy. More precisely, Slaughter highlights a critical
"tri-lemma" to which networks offer a solution: (1) the need for global
rules; (2) the problems of centralized power; and (3) the need for
75. See, e.g., Jason Liberi, The Financial Stability Forum: A Step in the Right Direction ... Not
Far Enough, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 549 (2003); Geoffrey P. Miller & Gerald Rosenfeld,
Intellectual Hazard: How Conceptual Biases In Complex Organizations Contributed to the Crisis of
2008, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 807 (2010); David Zaring, International Institutional Performance in
Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT'L L. 475 (2010).
76. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 73, at 12.
77. See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992).
78. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 283, 298 (2004).
79. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Accountability of Government Networks, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 347, 359 (2001); Zaring, supra note 15, at 214-15.
80. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 73, at 10-11, 24.
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mechanisms of political accountability for regulatory actors. 8
Notwithstanding both these great expectations and the particular
emphasis on financial regulation in the study of transnational regulatory
networks, financial networks played a relatively limited role in the
recent financial crisis. 82  They did not prevent the crisis, of course,
whether through intervention or even mere warning. Nor did they play
any significant role in ending, or even minimizing, the crisis once it was
underway. Even entities seemingly tailor-made to serve relevant
functions, including the Financial Stability Forum and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, were largely absent. How can this
anomaly be explained? At least in part, because of the constraints of
institutional salience outlined supra.
Even to those in relevant fields, transnational regulatory networks are
relatively unfamiliar. By dint of their bureaucratic membership, lack of
fixed meeting schedule, and the like, meanwhile, they lack visibility.
They lack singularity and uniqueness, in turn, at least because of the
multiplicity of relevant networks. A certain lack of singularity can also
be seen in networks' representative/participatory nature and in the fact
that they do not generate binding policies for the relevant group. Rather,
each national representative exhibits the quality of a free agent within
the network structure. Finally, for the same reason, networks are non-
authoritative. Their diminished legitimacy, by comparison with more
formal institutions, may further reduce their authority, especially given
the distributional consequences of relevant policy choices amidst
financial crises.83 Only with regard to the dimension of expertise might
networks be expected to possess significant salience, as compared to
other entities, including international institutions with more general
mandates.
Overall, then, networks may be relatively ill-equipped to shape
expectations among alternative market equilibria, in the face of potential
and actual financial crises. To more fully appreciate as much, it is worth
considering the particular case of the former Financial Stability Forum.
To begin, the latter helps clarify the limits of networks generally. With
an eye to the transformation of the Financial Stability Forum into the
Financial Stability Board in the midst of the recent crisis, it also suggests
particular institutional features that may be relevant to the shaping of
salience, and ways in which the potential impact of networks might be
81. See id. at 10, 257.
82. See Zaring, supra note 75, at 478; see also Zaring, supra note 15, at 215-16.
83. One might consider, in this vein, of the narrower distributional issues manifest in the decision
to bailout Merrill Lynch, but not Lehman Brothers--or of the broader distributional questions attendant
to the use of public funds to bailout private entities.
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increased in this regard.
B. Financial Stability, from Forum to Board
Established by the G-7 in 1999, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
was given a fairly broad mandate amidst the increasingly globalized
financial markets. It was charged, as such, with three tasks: (1) to assess
vulnerabilities affecting the financial system; (2) to identify and oversee
action to address such vulnerabilities; and (3) to promote coordination
and information exchange among national-level financial regulators.84
In the service of these ends, its membership consisted of representatives
of the finance ministries and central banks of each of the G-7 countries,
along with a handful of additional participants.
Notwithstanding the close congruence between this mandate and the
prevention and alleviation of financial crises, the FSF played only a
minor role in the recent crisis.86 With some eye to this failure, the G-20
initiated a substantial reform of the FSF in November 2008. To begin, it
expanded its membership to include the rest of the G-20, as well as
representatives of Spain and the European Commission.87 Five months
later, the G-20 went a step further, "re-establishing" the FSF as the
Financial Stability Board (FSB).
Besides its expanded membership and new appellation, the new board
was placed on what the G-20 termed "strengthened institutional
foundations."8 9  In particular, a Secretary-General was appointed to
preside over the new board and an expanded secretariat. 90 A fixed
schedule of meetings was set out, along with explicit mandates as to the
required seniority of national representatives to the FSB. 91 Finally, a
steering committee was established, to continue the work of the FSB
84. See Fin. Stability Bd., Mandate, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/mandate.htm
(last visited June 13, 2010) [hereinafter FSB Mandate]; see also Larry CatA Backer, Sovereign Wealth
Funds as Regulatory Chameleons: The Norwegian Sovereign Wealth Funds and Public Global
Governance Through Private Global Investment, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 425, 496 (2010).
85. See Fin. Stability Bd., History, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history.htm (last
visited June 13, 2010).
86. See Zaring, supra note 75, at 478.
87. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Decides to Broaden Its
Membership (Mar. 12, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/pr__090312b.pdf
[hereinafter FSF Decides to Broaden Its Membership].
88. See Press Release, Fin. Stability Forum, Financial Stability Forum Re-established as the
Financial Stability Board (Apr. 2, 2009), available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/press/
pr_090402b.pdf [hereinafter FSF Re-established as the FSB].
89. See FSF Decides to Broaden Its Membership, supra note 87.
90. See FSF Re-established as the FSB, supra note 88.
91. See id
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between its plenary sessions, along with a series of standing committees
and ad hoc working groups.92
The substantive mandate of the FSB was likewise enhanced. Beyond
the aforementioned obligations of the FSF, the FSB was also made
responsible for monitoring and advising on market developments,
suggesting best practices for meeting regulatory standards, undertaking
strategic reviews of the policy development work of international
standard-setting bodies, and setting guidelines for the establishment of
supervisory colleges for systemically significant financial institutions.9 3
The FSB thus emerged from the crisis a more structured, prominent, and
authoritative organization.
C. Salience and the Financial Stability Board
In the transition from the FSF to the FSB, one might see some indicia
of enhanced salience and hence an increased ability to serve the
coordination functions necessary for financial stability. Many of the
institutional design changes enumerated in the preceding section can
thus be understood-or at least evaluated-through the framework of
salience proposed herein. Minimally, those changes help to elucidate
the determinants of salience outlined supra.
Consider, to begin, questions of familiarity. Notwithstanding a
dramatically altered membership, an enhanced administrative structure,
increased institutional continuity, and a broadened mandate, the name of
the Financial Stability Forum was only altered in the most minor of
ways. Equally striking was the consistent emphasis of the G-20 on the
"re-establishment" of the FSB.94 Incoherent as it is, the latter implies a
certain familiarity. The importance of such familiarity might also be
seen in the G-20's prescription of mandatory FSB consultations with
non-members.95 Even with its already expanded membership, such
consultations might be expected to play an important role in enhancing
familiarity with the FSB.
The latter point might likewise be tied to the visibility of the FSB.
Other dimensions of the transition from the Forum to the Board,
however, are even clearer in this regard. Most explicitly, there is the
strong emphasis in the FSB's charter documents on the need to play a
more prominent role in the financial community and in regulatory




95. See FSB Mandate, supra note 84.
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outreach to raise the visibility of its work and its role in the international
financial system." 96  The imposition of a regular meeting schedule,
including mandated time frames for plenary sessions and regular
steering committee meetings, might also be understood in this regard.97
Most important, however, may be the strong linkage of the work product
of the FSB to the efforts of more prominent international institutions,
including the IMF.
By the terms of its charter, thus, the periodic reports of the FSB are to
be released in conjunction with the annual meetings of the IMF and the
World Bank.98  Substantively, among the most significant new
responsibilities given to the FSB-the conduct of so-called "Early
Warning Exercises"-is to be undertaken in partnership with the IMF. 99
As described in the G-20's charge to the FSB, such exercises are meant
to "strengthen assessments of systemic, low probability-high impact
risks to the global outlook" and to "identify policy options to mitigate
them."1oo They are to be conducted semi-annually, and presented at the
annual meetings of the IMF and World Bank-further highlighting the
dimension of visibility. 01 Even the mere conduct of such far-reaching
assessments in conjunction with the IMF, however, might be expected to
increase the visibility of the FSB and its regulatory role.
Questions of singularity and uniqueness present a more complex
picture, in terms of the impact of the transition to the FSB on
institutional salience. Consider the increased membership of the FSB.
At one level, as suggested with reference to networks generally,
increased size and a more diverse membership might be expected to
diminish the FSB's capacity to signal the necessary level of singularity.
On the other hand, an expanded FSB membership might be cast as a
distinct source of singularity and uniqueness. Thus, one might imagine
the FSB holding itself out as distinctive-even unique-in the
comprehensive (yet perhaps still manageable) scope of its membership.
The more limited the membership of a given network, stating the point
differently, the more plausible it is to imagine a distinct group of nation-
states coalescing around their own network and engaging the same issue.
Hence the diminished singularity of almost any "Group" institution, be it
the G-7 or the G-77. Almost by definition, the latter framing signals a
96. See FSF Re-established as the FSB, supra note 88.
97. See id.
98. See Fin. Stability Bd., Charter, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/
r_090925d.pdf (last visited June 13, 2010) (hereinafter FSB Charter].
99. See id.
100. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Fact Sheet: IMF-FSB Early Warning Exercise, available at
http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/exr/facts/pdf/ewe.pdf (last visited June 13, 2010).
10 1. See id
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lack of uniqueness, by comparison with other potential institutional
structures. 102
One might also see certain of the FSB's institutional design changes
as modulating any negative impact of increased membership on the
FSB's singularity/uniqueness. Both the appointment of a secretary-
general authorized to speak for the FSB and the creation of a narrower
steering committee for the organization might be understood in this
regard. With each reform, the costs of increased membership-in terms
of singularity-are diminished.
The shift from the FSF to the FSB might likewise be seen as
increasing the salience of the organization, in terms of relevant
authority. This begins with the expanded mandate of the FSB.
Generally, such increased authority might be expected to enhance the
salience of the efforts of the FSB. That said, one might also see some
downside to increased authority, given its potential to diminish the
FSB's focus. Its authority, as broadly defined supra, might thus be
reduced -insofar as the organization's targeted mandate to maintain
financial stability is diluted by other responsibilities. Its distinct
expertise, putting the point differently, might be undermined by a
broader mandate.
Finally, two other reforms might also be highlighted, with regard to
the authority of the FSB and the resulting salience of its efforts to
prevent and alleviate financial crises. To begin, the adoption of a formal
charter could be seen to offer enhanced legitimacy to the organization
and perhaps an appearance of authority more generally.103 The mandate
for "balanced representation" on the FSB's steering committee might
also be cited in this regard.104 Such balanced representation might fairly
be seen to enhance the legitimacy of the FSB, to impact thereby its
perceived authority, and consequently to increase its salience in
responding to potential and actual financial crises.
CONCLUSION
In designing regulatory institutions to respond to-and perhaps even
to prevent-financial crises, many factors are likely relevant. An
underappreciated one, to date, has been the comparative ability of one
institutional framework versus another to shape the expectations of
102. The point becomes clearer when one recalls that there are actually several G-20's--one
comprised of major industrialized states and large developing countries and the other exclusively of
developing countries.




market participants. In preventing the onset of a financial crisis and
triggering a quick exit once one is upon us, this task of shaping
expectations is critical. Hence the emphasis on salience herein, and on
the need to determine the capacity of distinct institutions-international
versus national, new versus established, and network versus
organization-to play this role.
It is not the claim herein that salience-or even the shaping of
expectations-is all that matters in addressing financial crises, or even in
designing institutions to do so. It is critical, however. Alleviation of the
persistent inattention to which it has been subject is consequently useful.
While it may not offer an answer to the perennial challenge of financial
crises, it will help to move us in the right direction.
